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Abstract
This article elaborates the organizational literature’s process theory of compassion – 
an empathic response to suffering – which falls short of adequately explaining why and 
how compassion unfolds readily in some workplace situations or settings but not in 
others. We address this shortcoming by calling attention to the basic uncertainty of 
suffering and compassion, demonstrating that this uncertainty tends to be particularly 
pronounced in organizational settings, and presenting propositions that explain how 
such uncertainty inhibits the compassion process. We then argue that understanding 
the accomplishment of compassion in the midst of uncertainty necessitates regarding 
compassion as an enactment of courage, and we incorporate insights from the 
organizational literature on everyday courageous action into compassion theory. We 
conclude with a discussion of implications in which we underscore the importance of 
organizational support for the expression of suffering and the doing of compassion, and 
we also consider directions for future research.
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My mother passed away completely unexpectedly … I’m still in shock … I did not expect 
any of the compassion and sympathy and the love, the actual love that I got from my 
co-workers. You don’t expect that … They took up a donation, beautiful flowers, cards … 
[My boss] was extremely understanding … I took the first two weeks off, and then I came 
back to work and then I ended up being so stressed with everything that surrounded my 
mother’s death, how she died, I couldn’t concentrate … I would just shake … so I ended up 
going on a [leave] for eight weeks … I was very, very new to the [unit] … I was never made 
to feel guilty, or made to feel bad. I knew that I was in everyone’s prayers and I knew that 
when I did come back, that I would be in a condition that I could give back what I had 
received. (Lilius et al., 2011b: 879–880)
In the past 15 years, the organization studies literature has seen a burgeoning interest in 
compassion – an empathic, dynamic response to suffering. This interest stems from two 
basic insights, both of which are evident in the opening story told by a female employee 
at a Midwestern hospital’s physician billing unit. The first is that suffering is a significant 
and pervasive, though often invisible, aspect of organizational life (Frost, 1999; see also 
Driver, 2007; Frost et al., 2000). The second is concisely summarized by Frost et al. 
(2006: 843), who say, ‘[C]ompassion can help to make a heavy burden of suffering more 
bearable … [It] is a healing force that is indispensable in organizations.’ Indeed, research 
finds that compassion is linked to a range of psychological, physiological, relational and 
job performance benefits (for sufferers, compassion providers, and third parties who wit-
ness or learn about the compassion) and can thus mitigate the hundreds of billions of 
dollars in annual organizational losses associated with suffering (for a review, see Dutton 
et al., 2014). Still, although the ubiquity of suffering and the indispensability of compas-
sion are now more widely acknowledged realities of organizational life, it is curious that 
attention to suffering and compassion is the exception rather than the norm in many 
workplaces (see Frost, 2003; Tsui, 2010). This observation raises questions about why 
and how compassion unfolds readily in some organizational situations or settings but not 
in others – questions the present article aims to answer.
The extant organizational theory on compassion has advanced our understanding of 
the phenomenon in many ways (e.g. Frost et al., 2000; Kanov et al., 2004), but it falls 
short of adequately answering these critical questions. Although Dutton et al.’s (2014: 
293) recent and comprehensive review of the compassion literature highlights a range 
of contextual enablers and disablers that shape ‘whether and how interpersonal compas-
sion unfolds,’ others maintain that organizational compassion theory is too idealistic 
and unproblematic (e.g. Simpson et al., 2014). Accordingly, our aim in the present arti-
cle is to refine compassion theory with an eye toward developing a more nuanced expla-
nation of the relationship between suffering and compassion. Our elaborated theory, 
which centers on a consideration of uncertainty, extends Frost’s (1999: 129) observation 
that the doing of compassion ‘requires a degree of courage’ (see also Jinpa, 2015). 
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Frost’s mention of courage, which organizational scholars characterize as intentional 
action undertaken in the face of uncertainty in pursuit of morally worthy goals (Koerner, 
2014; Worline et al., 2002), implicitly appreciates the riskiness and uncertainty of com-
passion (see also Frost et al., 2000). Although this observation is articulated in Frost’s 
(1999) seminal essay, there has been little subsequent attention to uncertainty (and cour-
age) in the organizational literature on compassion. Addressing this oversight is, in our 
view, essential to developing a deeper theoretical understanding of the actual doing of 
compassion.
In the sections that follow, we first briefly review the literature on suffering and com-
passion to establish a foundation for our core arguments. Subsequently, we flesh out the 
idea that suffering and compassion fundamentally involve uncertainty for sufferers and 
focal actors (i.e. people demonstrating compassion). We also argue that such uncertainty 
is likely to be particularly pronounced in organizational settings, and we propose an 
elaborated theoretical model that explains how it inhibits the compassion process. From 
there, we draw on the emerging literature on everyday courageous action to explain how 
compassion is accomplished in the midst of uncertainty, and we conclude with a discus-
sion of theoretical and practical implications as well as directions for future research.
Suffering and compassion
A review of the extant literature
Although compassion is sometimes conceptualized as a general concern for another’s 
well-being (e.g. Boyatzis and McKee, 2005), it is more often seen as fundamentally 
linked with suffering. Indeed, its Latin root literally means ‘to suffer with,’ and promi-
nent scholars from a variety of disciplines invoke suffering with respect to compassion 
(e.g. Jinpa, 2015; Nussbaum, 1996; Rynes et al., 2012). Following this intellectual tradi-
tion, we regard compassion as inextricably associated with suffering – a mental and 
emotional ‘anguish which we experience on one level as a threat to our composure, our 
integrity, and the fulfillment of our intentions but at a deeper level as a frustration to the 
concrete meaning that we have found in our personal experience’ (Reich, 1989: 85; see 
also Cassell, 2002; Pollock and Sands, 1997). People suffer when their basic sense of self 
is injured or threatened.
Suffering is a significant and inescapable reality of organizational life (Frost, 1999; 
Frost et al., 2000). Because suffering knows no boundaries, and given that people spend 
a tremendous amount of time at work, organizations inevitably harbor whatever suffer-
ing their members endure (Frost, 2003; Kanov et al., 2004). Such suffering often stems 
from the turmoil of everyday life, which can include relationship struggles, physical or 
mental health problems, financial woes, the death or severe illness of loved ones, or other 
personal issues. In some cases, organizations themselves or a subset of their members 
may be subject to traumatic events such as acts of terrorism, extreme violence, or envi-
ronmental calamities that can induce widespread internal suffering (e.g. Dutton et al., 
2002, 2006; Powley, 2009). Furthermore, regardless of whatever emotional pain people 
bring with them to work, many of the typical goings-on within organizations have the 
potential to elicit suffering in organizational members (Frost, 2003). For instance, 
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research suggests that various forms of nonphysical workplace aggression such as bully-
ing and abusive supervision are rampant and taking a significant psychological (as well 
as financial) toll on workers (for a review, see Tepper, 2007). Organizational actions such 
as downsizings, reorganizations and the adoption of new organizational designs and 
management initiatives have also been linked to significant employee suffering (for a 
review, see Driver, 2007). Additionally, the intense, high-performance environments of 
some of today’s leading organizations such as Amazon and Apple have been character-
ized as both thrilling and emotionally bruising (e.g. Kantor and Streitfeld, 2015). All 
told, whatever its form or cause, suffering pervades organizational life and is likely cost-
ing organizations hundreds of billions of dollars annually (see Dutton et al., 2014).
In light of the connection between compassion and suffering, Frost et al. (2006: 843) 
characterize compassion as ‘indispensable in organizations’ because of its potential to 
mitigate the emotional, psychological, physical and financial costs of suffering (Kanov 
et al., 2004; Powley, 2013). Although compassion is often characterized as an emotion 
(e.g. Goetz et al., 2010; Nussbaum, 2003), most considerations also recognize cognitive 
and behavioral qualities and note significant phenomenological complexity (e.g. Blum, 
1980; Clark, 1997; Jinpa, 2015; Wuthnow, 1991). Building on this, the predominant 
organizational perspective regards compassion as a multi-faceted relational process 
involving the following interrelated sub-processes that play out between at least one focal 
actor and sufferer: experiencing and expressing suffering, noticing the suffering, feeling 
empathic concern, acting with the aim of easing or alleviating the suffering, and sense-
making (Atkins and Parker, 2012; Dutton et al., 2014; Kanov et al., 2004). This frame-
work suggests that compassion is only manifest in the combined, dynamic interrelationships 
of these processes. Accordingly, labeling a discrete act, behavior or feeling as compas-
sionate is only sensible from this perspective if the other processes are also in play.
This understanding of compassion has informed a growing body of research, which 
finds that the doing, experiencing and witnessing of compassion are associated with 
beneficial individual, relational and organizational outcomes. For example, research 
indicates that instances of compassion at work are associated with the experience of posi-
tive emotions, the making of positive meaning, enhanced coworker relationships, and 
increases in organizational commitment (Frost et al., 2000; Grant et al., 2008; Lilius 
et al., 2008). For those whose jobs involve the regular giving of care or the handling of 
others’ suffering, displays of compassion are associated with a reduction in job-related 
burnout (Kahn, 1993; O’Donohoe and Turley, 2006). Other research finds that when 
traumatic events befall organizations – situations in which suffering is particularly sali-
ent – the compassion process plays a critical role in the activation of resilience and the 
subsequent process of healing (Powley, 2009, 2013).
In addition to specifying its core sub-processes, coverage of compassion in the organ-
izational literature emphasizes other essential qualities. For one, compassion is regarded 
as a relational process in which sufferers and focal actors are full and active participants 
in its accomplishment (Kanov et al., 2004; Reich, 1989). The suggestion, in other words, 
is that compassion exhibits mutuality (Miller and Stiver, 1997), that is, active and 
engaged connection with others; it is an intentional (rather than purely reflexive) process, 
with its unfolding dependent on sufferers’ and focal actors’ willful and persistent coop-
eration (see Dutton et al., 2014). Related to this, the doing of compassion is understood 
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to significantly affect not just sufferers, but also focal actors as well as witnesses or third 
parties (Lilius et al., 2008; Miller, 2007). Additionally, the compassion sub-processes are 
assumed to ‘coevolve and interact dynamically’ rather than unfold linearly (Atkins and 
Parker, 2012: 528). They play out recursively such that there is back-and-forth move-
ment across the sub-processes and often at least some coincidence in their occurrence – 
an assumption that is consistent with empirical evidence (e.g. Way and Tracy, 2012).
Some organizational scholars have attempted to represent the burgeoning literature on 
compassion in a concrete theoretical model (i.e. Atkins and Parker, 2012; Dutton et al., 
2014). The Dutton et al. (2014) model (see Figure 1) is the most comprehensive, and we 
therefore use it as the starting point for the more elaborated understanding of compassion 
we develop in the present article. The publication of this model marked a significant con-
tribution to the organizational compassion literature in that the model brings together a 
number of disparate ideas, including those outlined above, that had previously not been 
well integrated. Most notably, the model captures the core compassion sub-processes, 
depicts their complex interrelationships, and situates the compassion process in context.
Further considerations of the compassion model
Its achievements notwithstanding, there are insights about compassion within the extant 
literature that the Dutton et al. (2014) model itself does not adequately represent. In this 
section, we offer a modestly revised model (see Figure 2). The purpose of this initial 
Figure 1. The compassion process, as depicted by Dutton et al., 2014.
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revision is to bring greater clarity to certain previously considered aspects of the compas-
sion process that are not reflected in Dutton et al.’s (2014) model, thus making the model 
more consistent with the extant literature. Making these revisions is a necessary step on 
our way in this article to ultimately presenting new insights that more substantially elab-
orate compassion theory.
Our modifications to the Dutton et al. (2014) center on three qualities: (i) the recursiv-
ity of the relationships between the sub-processes of compassion; (ii) the mutuality of 
compassion; and (iii) the idealism that is often implicitly ascribed to compassion in gen-
eral. First, the extant research suggests there are complex relationships among the com-
passion sub-processes (e.g. Atkins and Parker, 2012; Way and Tracy, 2012). Dutton et al. 
(2014: 292–293) acknowledge this, noting that the compassion sub-processes ‘may 
occur in different orders [and] can be recursive and repeated.’ That being said, we find 
that the overall configuration of the Dutton et al. (2014) model inadequately represents 
these dynamics. Our revised model depicts noticing, feeling and acting circularly to 
more clearly portray compassion’s complexity. Figure 2 also addresses recursivity on the 
sufferer side of the model – a modification that is consistent with Dutton et al.’s (2014) 
observation that sufferers (and focal actors) engage in sensemaking throughout the com-
passion process. This also aligns with suggestions that suffering involves the unraveling 
of sense and meaning and thus prompts sensemaking (e.g. Dutton et al., 2002; Reich, 
1989; Scarry, 1985).
Figure 2. The reconfigured compassion process.
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Second, although the Dutton et al. (2014) model attends to all involved parties (i.e. the 
sufferer, focal actor and third parties) and thus shifts our attention away from an exclu-
sive focus on a single party, it does not explicitly depict mutuality throughout the com-
passion process. This is a noteworthy oversight because the assumption that compassion 
involves the active and engaged participation of sufferers as well as focal actors has 
received theoretical and empirical support (e.g. Reich, 1989; Way and Tracy, 2012). To 
address this, Figure 2 incorporates an additional sufferer sub-process – agentic receiving 
and reacting – to further specify that sufferers and focal actors alike play a mutual, ongo-
ing role in the accomplishment of compassion. In accordance with Dutton et al.’s (2014) 
review, this modification makes explicit the reality that sufferers are not passive recipi-
ents of focal actors’ actions, but rather they actively and intentionally receive and react 
(or not) to these actions. Furthermore, Dutton et al. (2014: 296) call on scholars to exam-
ine ‘how [different] parties … interact and intentionally or unintentionally alter each 
other’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior throughout a particular compassion episode.’ In 
this spirit, we highlight the ongoing involvement of sufferers and focal actors such that 
sufferers’ experiences and expressions of suffering influence and are influenced by the 
responses of focal actors (and vice versa) as the process plays out.
A final concern with the Dutton et al. (2014) model stems from recent critiques, which 
argue that compassion tends to be viewed and portrayed too idealistically (e.g. Simpson 
et al., 2014). One such issue has to do with an implied ease and inevitability with which 
the compassion process unfolds. In the compassion literature, there are many indications 
that suffering often does not trigger compassion and that compassionate feelings and 
actions do not always follow from encounters with suffering (e.g. Frost et al., 2000; 
Lilius et al., 2008). Dutton et al. (2014) acknowledge and systematically review this 
research (see also Lilius et al., 2011a), and their model appropriately identifies a number 
of contextual factors that facilitate and/or inhibit compassion. That said, our concern is 
that their model depicts compassion with uninhibited relationships between its sub-pro-
cesses and thus seems to suggest that suffering tends to readily and reliably trigger com-
passion unless certain contextual factors interfere. We build on this research by 
considering how factors intrinsic to the process affect the accomplishment of compas-
sion. In doing so, we ultimately develop an elaborated model that more comprehensively 
explains when compassion is and is not likely to happen in response to suffering and that 
also sheds greater light on how contextual features influence the process.
In the remainder of the article, we present our arguments in two stages. First, we 
examine the compassion-inhibiting effects of sufferer and focal actor uncertainty (see 
Figure 3). Second, we draw on insights about courage to explain how compassion is 
accomplished given the disruptive effects of uncertainty. This consideration of courage 
culminates in our fully elaborated model of compassion, which further extends the ideas 
portrayed in Figure 3.
Uncertainty and the compassion process
Uncertainty is fundamental to suffering and compassion. In this section, we discuss this 
reality, consider how organizational environments tend to exacerbate such uncertainty, 
and explain how uncertainty interferes with the accomplishment of compassion. Our 
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Figure 3. How sufferer and focal actor uncertainty disrupts the compassion process.
arguments build to specific propositions that we incorporate into the elaborated theoreti-
cal model of compassion as depicted in Figure 3.
Suffering and uncertainty
By its very nature, suffering involves uncertainty. Sufferers grapple with existential 
threats with no idea of how the threats will resolve or when their sense of meaning 
will be restored (see Cassell, 2002; Gilbert, 1989; Reich, 1989). In fact, part of the 
reason why compassion makes a positive difference for sufferers is because it can 
help them make sense of such uncertainty (e.g. Dutton et al., 2002; Powley, 2009; 
Reich, 1989).
The context of suffering has the potential to compound its basic uncertainty. For 
instance, in the presence of other people, sufferers may be more inclined to doubt the 
legitimacy and acceptability of their own suffering or perhaps question whether its dis-
covery would lead to negative outcomes such as judgment or rejection. Such experiences 
further the uncertainty of suffering (Doka, 1987). In other words, to use Dutton et al.’s 
(2014: 288) terminology, the ‘relational context’ may heighten sufferers’ basic sense of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, Gilbert et al.’s (e.g. 2011, 2012) research on fear and resistance 
to compassion suggests that some individuals may be dispositionally more likely to 
experience suffering in this way. That is, aspects of the ‘personal context’ may also exac-
erbate the uncertainty of suffering (Dutton et al., 2014: 285).
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The organizational context also affects the uncertainty of suffering. For instance, in 
work organizations, which tend to be rife with suffering (e.g. Driver, 2007; Frost, 2003) 
as well as uncertainty in general (Galbraith, 1973; Simon, 1965), a preponderance of real 
or assumed norms and attitudes about the (in)appropriateness of suffering in the work-
place may compound sufferers’ basic sense of uncertainty (Bento, 1994; Eyetsemitan, 
1998). Indeed, the prevailing discourse in many organizations promotes artificial divi-
sions between the personal and professional realms of life, prioritizes organizational 
ends well above worker experience, and equates indications of pain and distress with 
weakness or incompetence (see Fineman, 2000; Frost, 2003). In short, the general mes-
sage is that the modern workplace is no place for suffering. To suffer, in this sense, is to 
be in violation of the rules of typical organizations (Frost, 1999) and thus to be at risk of 
eliciting a range of negative consequences (e.g. ostracism, judgment and/or a loss of or 
lack of access to status, material resources, opportunities or organizational membership). 
It is in this way that the organizational context may further the uncertainty of suffering 
– it is compounded through any sense of riskiness and unpredictability that accompanies 
the specter of such negative consequences.
Proposition 1a: The personal, relational and organizational contexts influence suf-
ferer uncertainty.
Although this proposition suggests that various aspects of the context may affect suf-
ferer uncertainty in multiple ways (e.g. increasing it or mitigating it), our focus in this 
article is on the organizational context and how it often tends to exacerbate sufferer 
uncertainty. This idea is consistent with empirical findings. For instance, a story in a 
study by Lilius et al. (2008), which examines how hospital employees do and do not 
respond to each other’s suffering, describes a nurse’s struggle to get time off in the days 
after her mother-in-law passed away. As a result, she ‘missed out on a lot,’ including the 
wake, and was unable to provide much-needed support for her husband and family. In an 
unpublished part of this story, the nurse goes on to say, ‘I believe I was treated very 
unfairly and uncompassionately because I am a quite steady worker [who] doesn’t make 
much noise because of fear of retaliation.’ Whether the risks she describes are real or 
imagined, the nurse conveys a clear sense of uncertainty with respect to how others 
might receive communication about her experiences and needs and what consequences 
such communication might invite.
How sufferer uncertainty affects the compassion process
The nurse’s story exemplifies that uncertainty can influence sufferers’ decisions about if 
and how to make information about their suffering available to others (see Bento, 1994). 
In particular, the nurse suggests that her uncertainty about how expressions of her suffer-
ing would be received led her to not ‘make much noise.’ This observation problematizes 
our understanding of compassion because compassion is only possible when suffering is 
present and expressed in some way such that there is opportunity for others to become 
aware of it and ultimately respond (see Kanov et al., 2004). The expression of suffering, 
in other words, is critical for activating compassion (Dutton et al., 2014).
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Our argument is that although sufferers may know that expressions of their suffering 
can potentially activate compassion, sufferers may also be cognizant of the possibility 
that suffering in work settings exposes them to significant negative outcomes. Sufferers 
from Frost et al.’s (2000: 34) research exemplify this. One describes her concern about 
how a senior colleague might view her expression of suffering in saying, ‘I was afraid 
she’d think less of me if I let her into some of the personal problems I was going through.’ 
Another conveys different concerns about how expressions of suffering might be 
received, commenting on ‘The pain of uncertainty. The pain of wondering if they’re 
going to be used in some way, or manipulated in some way, or even, the pain of thinking 
the worst about yourself and your prospects with the company.’ Such awareness, which 
may stem in part from aspects of sufferers’ personal or relational contexts, is likely to be 
particularly pronounced in work settings owing to the pervasive qualities of the organi-
zational context outlined above. The willful expression of suffering at work is therefore 
likely to seem to sufferers to be a risky undertaking. Indeed, even simply being in a state 
of suffering at work may seem risky because of concerns that one’s suffering may be 
expressed reflexively or unconsciously (see research on emotional leakage – e.g. Ekman 
and Friesen, 1969; Gross and Levenson, 1993), thus unintentionally revealing one’s suf-
fering to others. Considering this, and in light of research that finds a negative correlation 
between people’s tendency to engage in risky behaviors and their level of uncertainty 
about the likelihood of negative outcomes actually occurring in response to those behav-
iors (e.g. Marquis and Reitz, 1969), we suggest that sufferer uncertainty can inhibit com-
passion. More specifically, it can disrupt the relationships between the experience of 
suffering, the expression of suffering, and sensemaking; sufferers may refrain from 
engaging in certain activities (or they may even stay away from work altogether) so as to 
minimize their exposure to negative consequences that may follow from intentional and 
unintentional expressions of suffering.
Proposition 1b: The greater sufferers’ sense of uncertainty, the more their expressions 
of suffering will be constrained or inhibited.
This disruption to the expression of suffering can ultimately interfere with focal 
actors’ ability to notice suffering. Still, despite these potential problems, suffering does 
often show up and get noticed in the workplace in one way or another (Frost, 2003). That 
being said, sufferer uncertainty can derail the compassion process even after suffering is 
somehow expressed and noticed. As the agentic receiving and reacting sub-process 
depicted in Figure 2 reflects, the doing of compassion involves ongoing, mutual partici-
pation of sufferers and focal actors. Uncertainty can interfere with this mutuality by 
prompting sufferers to essentially withdraw from, decline or even overtly reject focal 
actors’ compassionate actions. This possibility is consistent with recent research indicat-
ing that being the focus of someone else’s compassion can elicit negative feelings such 
as fear, anxiety or resentment, which can then lead to resistance and rejection (e.g. 
Gilbert et al., 2011, 2012; Simpson et al., 2013). To the extent that such reactions convey 
to focal actors that their compassion is unwanted or unappreciated, focal actors may 
disengage and the compassion process would therefore falter.
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Proposition 1c: The greater sufferers’ sense of uncertainty, the more likely they are to 
receive and react to compassionate actions in ways that will inhibit compassion.
Compassion and uncertainty
As with suffering itself, there is inevitably some degree of ‘not-knowing’ when it 
comes to the doing of compassion (Frost et al., 2000: 32). Although encounters with 
suffering may instinctively trigger compassionate feelings (Goetz et al., 2010), consid-
erations of sensemaking suggest that the way focal actors interpret these encounters 
influences whether or not they stay connected with such feelings and respond with 
compassion (see Dutton et al., 2014). As with any other decision, this choice is made 
in a state of uncertainty (Jinpa, 2015). For instance, when confronted with suffering, 
there is often basic uncertainty about whether and why the person is suffering as well 
as about if and how to respond. There may also be uncertainty with respect to the for-
titude of the self, given that engaging with others’ suffering can be depleting for the 
focal actor (Figley, 1995; Frost, 2003), and it tends to confront focal actors with their 
own experiences of suffering (Hesse, 2002; Stamm, 1995). Aspects of the personal 
context influence the uncertainty of compassion. For instance, research finds that indi-
viduals vary in the extent to which they exhibit basic fears of expressing compassion 
for others (Gilbert et al., 2011). In terms of the relational context, uncertainty seems to 
be inversely associated with relationship closeness such that in closer relationships 
focal actors are likely to have a clearer understanding of sufferers’ needs and experi-
ences (Dutton et al., 2014; Frost et al., 2000).
As with suffering, the organizational context can play a particularly significant role in 
furthering the uncertainty of compassion. Pressures to do more with less, the preponder-
ance of incentives linked to individual achievement, and an emphasis on the economic 
evaluation of time (Frost, 2003; Pfeffer and DeVoe, 2012) are examples of factors that 
can contribute to focal actors’ uncertainty because they increase the apparent riskiness of 
compassion – the real or perceived likelihood that negative consequences may follow 
from displays of compassion. That is, in the face of compassion, focal actors may be 
uncertain as to whether or not compassion is safe (see Edmondson, 2004; Kahn, 1990). 
They may, for instance, see the doing of compassion as putting them at risk of missing 
out on desired rewards or of receiving punishments such that the time and effort it takes 
may seem to detract from task work and thus either interfere with the attainment of per-
formance-based incentives or elicit detrimental consequences stemming from a failure to 
meet performance expectations. For example, consider the following:
At one newspaper, a newsroom manager lost his wife to breast cancer. During his wife’s 
extended illness, the employee felt no compassion from his boss; instead he endured complaints 
about his relatively low level of production. On his first day back to work after the funeral his 
boss said, “I guess you’ll be working those 12-hour days again.” … In another example, a 
healthcare employee finally got pregnant after many years of trying, only to deliver a stillborn 
baby in her eighth month. When the woman’s boss stopped by her hospital room, she assumed 
he was there to offer his condolences. Instead he had come to ask her when she would return to 
work. (Dutton et al., 2002: 61)
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Although it is not possible to know what the bosses in these situations were thinking, the 
examples are consistent with the suggestion that organizational performance pressures 
can preclude compassion. Alternatively, focal actors may wonder whether a sufferer 
might somehow exploit or take advantage of their compassion (Gilbert et al., 2011), a 
concern that may be particularly likely in competitive organizational environments.
The personal/professional division that permeates organizational discourse (Frost 
et al., 2000) coupled with apparent trends toward less closeness in work relationships 
(e.g. Grant 2015; Korczynski, 2003) also affects the uncertainty of compassion. Suffering 
is often ambiguous in that indications of suffering are often not explicit or obvious. In 
organizational settings, this ambiguity can put focal actors in socially awkward posi-
tions. For example, encounters with actual or suspected suffering are particularly likely 
to elicit concerns about violating social norms or appearing nosy or intrusive (Frost et al., 
2000). A prospective focal actor from Frost et al.’s (2000: 33) research illustrates this in 
a comment about sufferers: ‘Unless they’ve conveyed to me that it’s a problem, I don’t 
go prying because I’m concerned they don't want to talk about it.’ Similarly, focal actors 
may worry about saying or doing something that sufferers might view as inappropriate 
or offensive, or they may be concerned about outing suffering and thus exposing suffer-
ers to unwanted organizational consequences such as those reviewed previously. As a 
result of a lack of clarity about the proper norms with respect to suffering and compas-
sion, the consequences that may follow from violating them, and the likelihood of those 
consequences actually happening, focal actors’ encounters with suffering at work are 
likely to be fraught with uncertainty.
Proposition 2a: The personal, relational and organizational contexts influence focal 
actor uncertainty.
Again, although this proposition suggests a variety of possibilities for how the context 
may affect focal actor uncertainty, we focus on the organizational context and its ten-
dency to exacerbate it.
How focal actor uncertainty affects the compassion process
The expression of suffering makes the noticing of that suffering possible and thus opens 
the door for compassion (Dutton et al., 2014). When one or more focal actors notice suf-
fering, which entails recognizing and attending to suffering cues they encounter and 
attuning to the experiences of the sufferer (Dutton et al., 2014; Kanov et al., 2004), their 
feelings as well as the ways in which they make sense of what is happening determine if 
and how the compassion process will unfold (Dutton et al., 2014; Kanov et al., 2004). It 
is in the interrelationships between these compassion sub-processes that focal actor 
uncertainty can be problematic.
Although encounters with suffering can reflexively evoke feelings of empathic con-
cern and motivate compassionate action, this progression is not always straightforward 
(e.g. Atkins and Parker, 2012). Indeed, research finds examples of a lack of compassion 
in the face of suffering at work (e.g. Lilius et al., 2008). Such findings are consistent with 
indications that everyday organizational realities (e.g. pressures for productivity and 
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efficiency) consume people’s attentional resources and thus often preclude ‘human 
moments’ at work (Hallowell, 1999; see also Hazen, 2008; Molinsky et al., 2012), which 
reduces the likelihood that people will notice others’ suffering (Frost, 2003). Given that 
the noticing of suffering is an active process that is as much about being alert with respect 
to the possibility that others may be suffering as it is about recognizing actual suffering 
cues, we suggest that focal actor uncertainty can further complicate this compassion sub-
process. Noticing suffering has to do with focal actors being ‘carefully mindful’ (Powley, 
2009: 1306) in turning outward toward the experience of the sufferer and attending to 
things in a way that is conscious of the wholeness of the people and the situation. In 
organizations, focal actor uncertainty, enhanced by a cognizance of the risks associated 
with suffering and compassion, can narrow focal actors’ focus and orient them inward, 
thus inhibiting the noticing of suffering (Lazarus, 1991; Shaw et al., 1994). It can, for 
instance, lead them to miss or purposely avoid suffering cues entirely or make sense of 
cues in ways that lead them to downplay or dismiss the suffering (or even the possibility 
of suffering).
Proposition 2b: The greater focal actors’ sense of uncertainty, the less likely they are 
to notice suffering cues.
Uncertainty can also create problems with respect to feeling empathic concern, the 
core feeling of compassion (Kanov et al., 2004). Empathic concern is an other-oriented 
feeling that emotionally connects a focal actor to a sufferer and manifests as a felt 
understanding of the sufferer’s experience. It involves an altruistic sense of care for the 
welfare of a sufferer and plays an important role in the compassion process in connect-
ing the noticing of suffering with compassionate action (Dutton et al., 2014; Lilius 
et al., 2011a). Even when focal actors suspect suffering or notice actual suffering cues, 
feelings of empathic concern do not necessarily follow (Atkins and Parker, 2012; 
Molinsky et al., 2012). With this in mind, we suggest that focal actor uncertainty can 
influence the feeling sub-process of compassion in at least two ways. First, as previ-
ously noted, the noticing of suffering may elicit feelings of fear and a basic sense of 
uncertainty (e.g. see Gilbert et al., 2011; Hesse, 2002; Stamm, 1995), which can trump 
or overshadow feelings of empathic concern (Eklund et al., 2009). Alternatively, 
uncertainty about the likelihood and severity of the various negative consequences 
associated with suffering and compassion may orient focal actors toward patterns of 
sensemaking that ultimately undermine or inhibit their felt empathic concern for the 
sufferer (see Atkins and Parker, 2012; Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005; 
Molinsky et al., 2012). In either case, our argument is that the daily pace and pressures 
of organizational life can overshadow or interfere with focal actors’ feelings of 
empathic concern for suffering individuals.
Proposition 2c: The greater focal actors’ sense of uncertainty, the less likely they are 
to feel empathic concern when faced with suffering.
Focal actor uncertainty can also interfere with compassionate actions, which are 
other-oriented behaviors aimed at somehow improving or making more bearable the 
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experience of a sufferer (Dutton et al., 2014; Kanov et al., 2004). They are enactments of 
the empathic concern a focal actor has for a sufferer and are targeted toward the suffer-
er’s unique needs (see also Dutton et al., 2002; Powley, 2009, 2012). Research on the 
bystander effect suggests that focal actors may refrain from taking action in the face of 
suffering if it is not unambiguously clear that someone is suffering, especially when there 
are real or perceived negative consequences associated with compassionate action 
(Fischer et al., 2011). This is particularly relevant to consider in work settings given the 
ambiguity of suffering. Furthermore, given that compassionate actions are often at least 
somewhat overt (for examples, see Lilius et al., 2008), they tend to increase the visibility 
of compassion and suffering both within the sufferer–focal actor relationship as well as 
to third parties, which can make the possibility of negative consequences seem more 
likely. When focal actors recognize this possibility in making sense of the situation and 
deciding if and how to act, their uncertainty with respect to the risks associated with 
compassionate action may increase or become more salient. This can prompt focal actors 
to refrain from acting compassionately or to act in half-hearted ways that are insensitive 
to sufferers’ unique needs. Either way there is a detriment to the compassion process. 
Moreover, when juxtaposed with a feeling of empathic concern, such (in)actions may 
induce in focal actors a state of dissonance (Festinger, 1957). To the extent this happens, 
focal actors may make sense of the situation in ways that justify their own inaction, 
which could undermine or disconnect them from empathic concern and further inhibit 
compassionate action.
Proposition 2d: The greater focal actors’ sense of uncertainty, the less likely they are 
to engage in compassionate action when faced with suffering.
Courage and accomplishment of compassion
To this point, we have argued that the basic uncertainty related to suffering and com-
passion is likely exacerbated in typical organizational environments, and we have 
articulated propositions about how this uncertainty interferes with the compassion 
process. Although these arguments deepen our understanding of the challenges of 
compassion, they also raise questions about how to reconcile an appreciation of the 
disruptiveness of sufferer and focal actor uncertainty – which is commonplace in 
work settings – with the empirical fact that compassion does actually happen in work-
places (e.g. Dutton et al., 2002; Frost et al., 2000). In this section, we consider how 
compassion is accomplished in the midst of uncertainty, which is something compas-
sion theory currently fails to do.
That being said, it is worth noting that there are implications for uncertainty within 
extant examinations of how aspects of the context influence the compassion process. 
Previous research has identified a multitude of personal (e.g. roles), relational (e.g. 
relationship closeness) and organizational (e.g. leader behaviors) contextual features 
that can facilitate or inhibit compassion (for reviews, see Dutton et al., 2014; Lilius 
et al., 2011a), and various explanations for how these features affect compassion are 
offered. For instance, Dutton et al. (2014) highlight a resource-based explanation for the 
influence of roles – that is, roles that carry a higher cognitive load limit the attentional 
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resources role-holders have available to notice and attend to others’ suffering. As 
another example, research on the influence of leader behavior on expressions of suffer-
ing and compassionate action emphasizes behavioral modeling and legitimization 
(Dutton et al., 2002, 2006; Kanov et al., 2004). Though it is not explicitly discussed, we 
see a common thread in this body of research, which is that a consideration of sufferer 
and focal actor uncertainty helps to explain how a number of contextual features affect 
the compassion process. For example, role-based socialization, which acculturates role-
holders to various rules of the organization (Cooper-Thomas and Anderson, 2005; Hogg 
and Terry, 2000; Pratt, 1998; Sluss and Thompson, 2012), can increase or decrease suf-
ferer and focal actor uncertainty depending on how it frames expressions of suffering 
and/or the doing of compassion. The extent to which role-holders see these activities as 
violating the rules is likely to correlate with their sense of uncertainty about engaging 
in them. Similarly, leaders who publicly express suffering or act compassionately in 
response to others’ suffering may convey to other organizational members that such 
behaviors are safe and acceptable (Frost et al., 2006), which can mitigate sufferer and 
focal actor uncertainty.
Overall, this body of research is consistent with Propositions 1a and 2a, which state 
that the context influences sufferer and focal actor uncertainty, respectively. More spe-
cifically, it suggests that features of the organizational context can mitigate sufferer and 
focal actor uncertainty and thus facilitate the accomplishment of compassion. Still, it 
does not address how uncertainty itself is overcome. This is a significant oversight 
because even when detrimental influences on sufferer and focal actor uncertainty are 
eased or alleviated, some uncertainty is likely to persist (e.g. doubts about the acceptabil-
ity of expressing suffering or compassion in a professional setting in general may be 
salient even if one’s particular organization seems accepting). Moreover, as argued pre-
viously, suffering and compassion involve a basic uncertainty (Frost, 1999; Reich, 1989). 
Therefore, a theory of compassion is incomplete if it does not explain how compassion 
is accomplished in the midst of uncertainty. Developing such an explanation, we suggest, 
necessitates seeing compassion as a courageous act. To elaborate this idea, we define 
courage and discuss how a consideration of courage helps us better understand and thus 
explain the accomplishment of compassion.
Courage
The construct of courage appears in scholarly conversations across academic disci-
plines and with varied theoretical foundations (Bournes, 2000; Pury and Kowalski, 
2007; Urmson, 1958; Walton, 1986). We limit the scope of this review to where it 
intersects the subjects of organizational behavior and compassion. Courage is a basic 
category of human conduct (Callan, 1993; Moran, 1946; Walton, 1986). Views of 
courage suggest it involves some combination of taking action, standing up for what 
you believe in, sacrificing and facing threats/fears/challenges, and overcoming obsta-
cles (Lopez et al., 2003). Courage has also been associated with energy, spirit, liveli-
ness and vigor (Murray et al., 1993), and characterized as a type of inner strength or 
willpower (Desmond, 1927) that is an enabler of change (Bologna, 1996). Courage 
has been likened to an internal force that empowers self-affirmation (Kohut, 1985), 
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which helps individuals push through their personal struggles (Armory et al., 1995; 
Worline, 2011). Courage knows no specific moral code, and yet it is afforded morality 
through both its intent and its manifestation. It is seen as the capacity to move ahead 
in spite of despair (May, 1975); to move through the boundary of fear (Bologna, 
1996); to meet directly dangers and difficulties (O’Brien, 1986; Armory et al., 1995; 
Walton, 1986); and to face personal fears, risks or threats (Finfgeld, 1995; Putman, 
1997; Rachman, 1976).
Although classical interpretations of Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas as well as some 
contemporary psychological perspectives see fear and imminent danger as central to 
courage (e.g. Rachman, 1990), these perspectives tend to emphasize a ‘blood and guts 
model’ of courage (Walton, 1986: 216). By contrast, Worline et al. (2002) theorize 
about everyday courage in organizations. Drawing on Shelp (1984) and Walton (1986), 
they argue that everyday courage ‘must be considered in the light of the ordinary 
activities in which people are engaged,’ and they conceptualize courage in organiza-
tional settings as ‘everyday action that involves risk, has been freely chosen, demon-
strates considered assessment of consequences, and pursues excellence’ (Worline 
et al., 2002: 297). As they further explain, ‘in the midst of uncertainty, courageousness 
puts an emphasis on judgment and helps to tip a situation toward worthy ends.’ Other 
organizational considerations of courage similarly leave room for fear and danger but 
suggest that risk (and more generally, uncertainty), intentionality, and moral motiva-
tion are essential elements of everyday courage (e.g. Koerner, 2014; Schilpzand et al., 
2014). Also evident in the organizational perspective on courage is the tendency to 
view courage as an ‘emergent pattern of action in context’ rather than a dispositional 
quality (Worline, 2011: 306).
The realities of the expression of suffering and the doing of compassion in organiza-
tions align well with what Worline et al. (2002) identify as the core elements of every-
day courage. First, as we have argued, there is typically significant uncertainty involved 
in these processes, which largely stems from the real or perceived risk of these activi-
ties triggering negative consequences. Furthermore, research suggests that sufferers 
and focal actors are generally cognizant of such riskiness (e.g. see Frost et al., 2000; 
Lilius et al., 2008). Additionally, these are active and intentional processes. That is, 
although there is reflexivity involved with the expression of suffering and other com-
passion sub-processes, their full enactment necessitates mutual, deliberate, and sus-
tained action over time (e.g. Reich, 1989). This is even the case with feeling empathic 
concern in that there is intentionality in determining whether or not to stay connected 
with one’s reflexive feelings (Atkins and Parker, 2012; Dutton et al., 2014). Finally, 
compassion involves the pursuit of morally worthy goals; sufferers’ and focal actors’ 
mutual efforts are oriented toward authentic human connection and caretaking (e.g. 
Frost et al., 2000, 2006). Overall, when there is uncertainty with respect to suffering 
and compassion – as we argue there often is (particularly in organizations) – seeing 
these activities as enactments of courage is essential for understanding their accom-
plishment. In this sense, uncertainty inhibits compassion in the ways we have argued, 
but compassion happens nonetheless when people act courageously to overcome these 
inhibitions.
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Our perspective on the courage of compassion follows others in focusing on coura-
geous action as opposed to dispositional courage (Koerner, 2014; Schilpzand et al., 2014; 
Worline, 2011), and we assume that anyone can act courageously when the conditions for 
courage are present (Worline, 2011). Therefore, to clarify, we are saying that when com-
passion happens in the face of uncertainty, the enactment is itself a manifestation of 
courage; we do not, in other words, characterize courage as an antecedent, enabler, mod-
erator or mediator of compassion.
Schilpzand et al.’s (2014) inductively generated process model of everyday organiza-
tional courage offers additional insights that enrich our theoretical understanding of 
compassion. One such insight has to do with the finding that courage, like compassion, 
is a responsive phenomenon (see also Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007). That is, just as com-
passion manifests in response to suffering, courageous action is found to happen in 
response to ‘specific challenging events … special types of incidents that are typically 
novel, unexpected, disruptive, demanding of attention, important, and critical’ 
(Schilpzand et al., 2014: 58). Taking this one step further, we see that instances of suffer-
ing in organizations map particularly well onto two of the four types of challenging 
events Schilpzand et al. (2014) identify in their data: those in which people encounter 
individuals in need or distress and those in which people are confronted with important 
decisions in the face of significant uncertainty. It therefore seems that instances of suffer-
ing set the stage not only for compassion, but also for courageous action. This observa-
tion changes the way we view suffering and thus broadens its organizational relevance. 
It is a painful and traumatic emotional state, yes, but from this perspective we also see 
that it is on a spectrum with other kinds of disruptive and detrimental organizational 
challenges.
Courage and the accomplishment of compassion
Schilpzand et al.’s (2014) theory suggests that challenging events are necessary but not 
sufficient for triggering courageous action. The key mediator is an actor’s felt responsi-
bility to act. That is, the occurrence of courageous action is found to hinge on an actor’s 
‘personal sense of obligation to act’ (Schilpzand et al., 2014: 64). This model parallels 
compassion theory, which suggests that encounters with suffering do not necessarily trig-
ger compassion and that felt empathic concern is a key mediator between the noticing of 
suffering and compassionate action. Our attention to the uncertainty of suffering and 
compassion coupled with this observed alignment between the compassion and courage 
process models prompts us to consider the role a felt responsibility to act plays in the 
doing of compassion.
Compassion scholars suggest that focal actors’ appraisals of suffering influence 
whether or not they will feel or stay connected with a feeling of empathic concern (Atkins 
and Parker, 2012). Even this recent attention to appraisals and sensemaking (see also 
Dutton et al., 2014), however, falls short of explaining why people sometimes make 
sense of their encounters with suffering in ways that are conducive to the feeling of 
empathic concern whereas other times they do not, and why sometimes people who feel 
empathic concern in encounters with suffering engage in compassionate action whereas 
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other times they do not (see Kanov et al., 2004). Our propositions about the role of uncer-
tainty in the compassion process partly address this, and we now look to Schilpzand 
et al.’s (2014) model of courageous action to further this explanation.
When focal actors notice suffering, which we see as a kind of challenging event within 
the Schilpzand et al. (2014) framework, compassion theory predicts that whether or not 
compassionate action will follow is a function of how the focal actors make sense of the 
suffering and whether or not they feel empathic concern for the sufferer. We see this logic 
as incomplete in that, whereas it helps us understand whether or not any deliberate 
response that focal actors take will be compassionate (i.e. focused on lessening, making 
more bearable, or alleviating the suffering), it does not help us understand whether or not 
focal actors faced with suffering will deliberately act at all. The missing piece of this 
puzzle, it seems, is focal actors’ motivation to be the one to act – a motivation that 
Schilpzand et al. (2014) characterize as a personal sense of responsibility to take action. 
Our suggestion, then, is that the accomplishment of compassion depends not only on 
focal actors noticing suffering, feeling empathic concern, sensemaking, and acting, as 
compassion theory presently suggests, but also on focal actors experiencing a felt respon-
sibility to act.
As noted previously, compassion is an intentional process in that sufferers and focal 
actors take an active role in its accomplishment (Dutton et al., 2014; Kanov et al., 2004; 
Reich, 1989). Indeed, it is this active, intentional nature that exposes compassion to the 
detrimental effects of sufferer and focal actor uncertainty. By this same logic, we argue 
that courage plays an important role in the doing of compassion, particularly for focal 
actors. Schilpzand et al. (2014: 64) identify a felt responsibility to act as the key mecha-
nism in driving courageous action, and find that it is associated with ‘approach-type 
emotions.’ Accordingly, we suggest that in the face of suffering, focal actors who experi-
ence a felt responsibility to act are likely to overcome the inhibiting effects of uncertainty 
and act compassionately.
Proposition 3: Focal actors’ felt responsibility to act drives compassionate action in 
the midst of uncertainty.
To account for the important role focal that actors’ felt responsibility to act plays in 
the accomplishment of compassion, we present Figure 4 as our fully elaborated model of 
compassion. In this figure, we locate ‘felt responsibility to act’ within the feeling sub-
process. Our reasoning is that focal actors’ felt responsibility to act complements the 
feeling of empathic concern in that the former motivates action (Schilpzand et al., 2014), 
whereas the latter guides the action to be compassionate (Kanov et al., 2004). This co-
location is intended to elaborate the feeling sub-process of compassion such that both of 
these feelings are regarded as playing an indispensable role in the accomplishment of 
compassion. Modeling the phenomena in this way further suggests that a felt responsibil-
ity to act influences and is influenced by other compassion sub-processes, as is the case 
with felt empathic concern (e.g. Dutton et al., 2014). Accordingly, focal actors’ felt 
responsibility to act may enhance their noticing of suffering and their feelings of empathic 
concern, and it may also influence the way focal actors make sense of the situation and 
their experiences.
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The nature of compassion is such that when focal actors overcome their uncertainty 
and respond to suffering with compassion, it can draw sufferers into the process, embold-
ening them to push through their own uncertainty and mutually engage with the focal 
actors. Whereas a sufferer’s general sense of uncertainty may persist, a focal actor’s 
compassionate action may essentially convey to the sufferer that it is okay to be vulner-
able in the relationship with the focal actor. Appreciating this possibility helps us see the 
significance of courage, not only with respect to the actions of focal actors but also 
throughout the compassion process. In light of this, Figure 4 depicts all of the relation-
ships between sub-processes that were disrupted by sufferer and focal actor uncertainty 
as restored yet still vulnerable to the effects of uncertainty.
Discussion
In this article, we elaborate organizational theory on compassion in multiple respects. 
First, after presenting a revised version of the Dutton et al. (2014) model (see Figure 2), 
we call attention to the basic uncertainty associated with suffering and compassion and 
propose that organizational environments typically exacerbate this uncertainty. Building 
on that, we articulate several propositions for how sufferer and focal actor uncertainty 
inhibits or interferes with the compassion process (see Figure 3). Collectively, these 
propositions highlight the various ways in which the compassion process is susceptible 
to the detrimental effects of sufferer and focal actor uncertainty. In addition to making 
Figure 4. How compassion is accomplished in the face of uncertainty.
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explicit the general idea that the compassion process is prone to failure, our coverage of 
uncertainty also emphasizes that the compassion process is particularly vulnerable in 
workplaces because such settings tend to feed into sufferers’ and focal actors’ basic 
uncertainty. We then raise the question of how compassion ever happens at all, given the 
disruptiveness of uncertainty. In response, we draw on Schilpzand et al.’s (2014) process 
theory of everyday courageous action to explain how compassion is accomplished in the 
midst of sufferer and focal actor uncertainty (see Figure 4). In the remainder of the arti-
cle, we discuss implications of our arguments as well as directions for future research.
The arguments outlined in this article move us toward a more realistic and nuanced 
understanding of the complexities of compassion. Although feelings of care and concern 
as well as motivations to help those who suffer may be a fundamental part of our human 
nature (Goetz et al., 2010; Wuthnow, 1991), suffering often does not prompt compas-
sionate responses, particularly in organizational settings (e.g. Frost, 2003; Lilius et al., 
2008), and compassionate responses are not always well received by sufferers (Simpson 
et al., 2014). Our elaborated theoretical model helps to explain why compassion in the 
face of suffering is not inevitable. In particular, it reveals vulnerabilities in the intercon-
nections between the compassion sub-processes that are susceptible to the compassion-
inhibiting effects of sufferer and focal actor uncertainty. In addition to appropriately 
problematizing our understanding of compassion (e.g. Simpson et al., 2014), this model 
depicts the doing of compassion as a form of everyday courageous action and in doing 
so identifies the felt responsibility to act as an important piece of the compassion puzzle. 
Although we have provided theoretical support for these ideas, a fruitful direction for 
future research would be to empirically test or further examine them.
Our attention to uncertainty and courage with respect to suffering and compassion 
opens up new possibilities in thinking about how and when compassion is and is not 
likely to happen. For one, this research suggests that uncertainty is a key moderator in 
the relationship between the context and the accomplishment of compassion. That is, 
aspects of the personal, relational and organizational context are likely to facilitate or 
inhibit compassion to the extent that they lessen or intensify (respectively) sufferer and 
focal actor uncertainty. In this sense, our elaborated model contributes to what is 
known about how previously examined contextual factors influence compassion. 
The present research also enriches our understanding of the feeling sub-process of 
compassion in proposing that the felt responsibility to act, along with felt empathic 
concern, plays an important role in the accomplishment of compassion. In addition to 
providing a testable proposition that future empirical research can examine, this insight 
sets the stage for an investigation of the factors or conditions that may influence focal 
actors’ felt responsibility to act. Schilpzand et al. (2014) find that a felt responsibility 
to act is influenced by relationship quality (between actors and others in the situation) 
and actors’ sense of power (namely, a sense of situational competence and authority). 
Although these findings seem to align with research indicating that the likelihood of 
compassion is in part a function of patterns of cognitive appraisals and sensemaking 
(Atkins and Parker, 2012; Dutton et al., 2014), and with other research demonstrating 
that relationship quality is an important enabling condition of compassion (e.g. Lilius 
et al., 2011b), we see a need for further empirical research that examines the felt 
responsibility to act more squarely in the context of compassion. We also see value in 
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further research that attends to compassion and courage simultaneously, as this could 
help to deepen our understanding of each phenomenon while also shedding greater 
light on the relationship between them. More generally, attention to courage and com-
passion orients us toward concerted efforts to acknowledge and investigate the inter-
relationships of virtues that organizational scholars currently tend to regard as discrete 
– an orientation for which a few scholars have recently advocated (e.g. Beadle et al., 
2015; Simpson, 2015).
This research responds to Dutton et al.’s (2014) call for greater attention to the rela-
tionality of compassion. Instead of regarding compassion as a one-way dynamic in which 
a focal actor gives and a sufferer receives compassion, we assume compassion involves 
a complex and ongoing mutuality between sufferers and focal actors (e.g. Reich, 1989). 
Accordingly, we attend to the active role the sufferer plays in eliciting, accepting and 
participating in compassion. More specifically, our explication of how uncertainty inhib-
its sufferers’ expressions of suffering as well as their willing and continued involvement 
in compassionate responses advances a theoretical argument for how the experience of 
the sufferer can impact the unfolding of the compassion process. At the same time, we 
also examine the disruptive effects of focal actor uncertainty throughout the process. 
Taken together, our attention to the roles and experiences of sufferers and focal actors 
demonstrates how both parties’ uncertainty can function as subtle but significant barriers 
to the mutual accomplishment of compassion.
The present research also furthers the idea that compassion – even at the dyadic level 
– is a true social accomplishment (see Dutton et al., 2006). That is, it underscores the 
reality that compassion in organizations is neither simple nor automatic, but rather 
involves intentional, effortful, morally motivated risk-taking. From this perspective, we 
can better see and appreciate the significance of otherwise invisible, benign, or taken-
for-granted activities and realities and in doing so shed light on a troubling paradox of 
organizational life. Although compassion is widely considered to be morally good and 
a basic expression of our humanity (e.g. Blum, 1980; Goetz et al., 2010), typical organi-
zational discourse, social norms and incentive systems feed into sufferer and focal actor 
uncertainty and thus turn the expression of suffering and the doing of compassion into 
risky acts of subversion. That is, acts such as telling a coworker about one’s own suffer-
ing or reaching out to a colleague who seems off in a subtle but noticeable way, or even 
simply coming to work in the wake of a personal tragedy, are bold undertakings that 
interrupt ‘the scripts, norms, roles, and routines that pattern organizational life’ (Worline 
et al., 2002: 299). They are exercises in profound vulnerability and are therefore likely 
to be even more emotionally tumultuous for sufferers and focal actors to engage in than 
we currently appreciate (see Jinpa, 2015). Yet compassion still happens, and when it 
does it acts as most organizations’ first and only line of defense against the deleterious 
effects of suffering (for a review, see Dutton et al., 2014). It is remarkable to us that 
many organizations implicitly if not explicitly perpetuate an environment of risk and 
uncertainty with respect to suffering and compassion – which impedes compassion and 
takes a heavy toll on those who do enact it (see Frost, 2003) – while also standing to 
benefit from whatever compassion their members still manage to accomplish. In this 
sense, we regard acts of compassion in such organizations as both extraordinarily cou-
rageous and heartbreakingly tragic.
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We point this out with the hope that it will help sympathetic readers appreciate a practical 
implication of this research: that the lessening of uncertainty with respect to suffering and 
compassion is a particularly humane and thus promising approach to cultivating compassion 
in organizations. This is an important implication because although the moral and business 
cases for compassion have been well articulated (e.g. Dutton et al., 2002; Frost, 2003), 
efforts to cultivate compassion have proven to be challenging. Such efforts can easily fail, 
cause unintended harm, or even exploit sufferers and focal actors (see Frost et al., 2006; 
Simpson et al., 2014). Translating what is known about compassion into practice must be a 
careful and nuanced undertaking; it is not simply a matter of implementing a particular set 
of practices (Lilius et al., 2011a; O’Donohoe and Turley, 2006). We suggest that a key rea-
son compassion cultivation efforts face challenges is because they are typically blind to 
sufferer and focal actor uncertainty. When practitioners are insensitive to such uncertainty 
and the conditions that give rise to it, their efforts implicitly necessitate courageous action 
and thus place an undue onus on organizational members. In organizational environments 
where uncertainty with respect to suffering and compassion is high, the expectation that 
members will act courageously time and again in the face of suffering is not only burden-
some, but also likely detrimental to members’ health and well-being over time (see Frost, 
2003). Moreover, although organizations may purport to be supportive of courageous action 
in general, there is reason to doubt whether they would truly support acts of courage that run 
contrary to organizational priorities (see Matthews, 1987). For these reasons, we suggest 
that practitioners interested in cultivating compassion in organizations honor courageous 
actions but focus their management efforts on the lessening of uncertainty. This approach 
would essentially make any instance of suffering less challenging of an event in the first 
place (see Schilpzand et al., 2014) and thus diminish the importance of courage in the 
accomplishment of compassion. That being said, we follow others in cautioning against tak-
ing this suggestion too far, given that systematic approaches to cultivating compassion risk 
undermining compassion through excessive or inappropriate institutionalization and control 
(Frost et al., 2006; Lilius et al., 2011a; O’Donohoe and Turley, 2006).
Conclusion
In taking a step back from the ground covered in this article, this research ultimately 
sheds light on the extraordinary within the ordinary. It highlights the fact that in the mun-
dane ebb and flow of organizational life there is significant suffering and uncertainty as 
well as the potential for compassion and courage. In grappling with these phenomena, we 
gain a greater appreciation of their everydayness, which helps to deepen our understand-
ing of the humanity and aliveness of organizational life (Frost, 1999; Weick, 1999). We 
come to see compassion in organizations as a true social accomplishment that depends 
largely on the effortful, heartfelt, courageous cooperation of individual actors. Finally, 
this research helps us recognize that although the everyday courage of compassion is 
remarkable, we must not lose sight of the role organizations can play in supporting or 
‘awakening’ compassion and thus taking courage out of the equation (Worline and 
Dutton, in press). If we are blind to this reality, we will likely stay the course in designing 
or perpetuating ‘toxic’ organizational systems in which the doing of compassion is 
exceptional and a matter of courage (Frost, 2003).
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